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INTRODUCTION
The principal purpose of copyright law in the United States is to
protect the pecuniary rights of copyright holders.1 The law ensures that
copyright holders retain exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute their
original works, to prepare derivative works, and to publicly perform and
display certain types of works.2 Thus, the law—codified in the
Copyright Act of 1976 [1976 Act]—primarily concerns the economic
value of a copyright.3
In copyright infringement cases, two types of remedies are
generally available upon determining liability: (1) the copyright holder’s
actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer,4 or (2)
The first remedy involves a relatively
statutory damages.5
straightforward evaluation of evidence; the copyright holder is required
only to provide proof of the infringer’s gross revenue, while the infringer
must prove both deductible expenses and profits not attributable to the
copyrighted work.6 By contrast, calculating statutory damages in such
cases is comparatively more complicated.
To compute statutory damages, the court examines, among other
factors, evidence of willful infringement and potential fair use defenses.7
But because statutory damages are decided on a “per work” basis,8 the
difficulty lies in accurately defining what constitutes “one work,” and
the Circuits are split on the issue.9 The 1976 Act reads, in relevant part:
“[T]he copyright holder may elect . . . to recover . . . an award of statutory
damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any
one work . . . all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute
1. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Moral Rights for University Employees and Students: Can
Educational Institutions Do Better than the U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53 (2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West 2017).
5. § 504(a)(2) (West 2017).
6. § 504(b) (West 2017).
7. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017).
8. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017).
9. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The circuits are split as
to how to determine what constitutes ‘one work’ for purposes of statutory damages
calculations.”).
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one work” (emphases added).10
The Circuits disagree as to the correct interpretation of “one
work,”11 and this lack of uniformity among the courts leads to
uncertainty in awarding damages in copyright infringement cases. For
each infringed work, the copyright holder may receive statutory
damages ranging from $750 to $30,000,12 depending upon the court’s
judgment of fair compensation.13 If, for example, the infringed work is
one album and the copyright holder elects to recover statutory damages,
the award would total at least $750, but no more than $30,000, for a
single work. By contrast, if the court considers each of the album’s ten
music tracks as separate works (and finds that all of them have been
infringed), then statutory damages could amount to $300,000 (four
hundred times the amount awarded to the copyright holder of the lone
infringed album).14 Certainly, the court’s determination of the number
of infringed works in a particular case “strongly impacts the amount of
the statutory damage award.”15
Therefore, the Circuit split, on the issue of deciding the number of
infringed works in any given case, creates ambiguity that should be
eliminated to provide consistency in awarding statutory damages. This
note will first review the history of copyright law in the United States as
it relates to statutory damages (focusing on the development of the 1976
Act), then assess the two tests for “one work” currently employed by the
courts, and finally propose a solution for resolving the divide among the
Circuits by blending the two approaches together to balance the
economic value of a copyright with the obligation to uphold copyright
law as the fundamental mechanism for protecting creation.

10. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017).
11. BMG Rights Mgmt., 199 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
12. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017).
13. If the court finds that the infringer did not know and had no reason to know that his
or her acts constituted copyright infringement, the court may reduce the statutory damages
award to a minimum of $200. But in cases where the infringement was committed willfully,
the court may increase the statutory damages award to a maximum of $150,000. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 504(c)(2) (West 2017).
14. See generally Sarah A. Zawada, “Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on the Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law,
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 129 (2006) (providing examples to highlight the effect of
the court’s determination of the number of infringing works on statutory damages
calculations).
15. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Damages: The Copyright Acts of 1790, 1909, and 1976
At common law, copyright holders were entitled only to actual
damages and profits as compensation for infringement.16 In some
circumstances, however, the courts could not ascertain these figures with
sufficient accuracy.17 Consequently, Congress implemented statutory
damages as an alternative to actual damages and profits.18
The earliest provision for statutory damages, the 1790 Act,
“ ‘ specifically . . . recognize[d] the rights of authors.’ ” 19 During the
nineteenth century, Congress expanded the remedies available to victims
of copyright infringement, and all such legislation was eventually
consolidated into the 1909 Act.20 This newer Act was the first to offer
copyright holders the option to choose between actual damages and
profits and “such damages as to the court shall appear just.”21 In addition
to other provisions, the 1909 Act offered guidelines to assist the court in
assessing statutory damages.22 Even at its inception, statutory damages
presented a question of interpretation—in this case, of the number of
infringing performances: at least one court understood these guidelines
as indicating that “one ‘infringement’ may nevertheless result in more
than one ‘performance.’ ” 23 The 1909 Act limited statutory damages to
no less than $250 and no more than $5,000 per infringement.24
Despite having combined then-current copyright legislation into
one cohesive document, the 1909 Act was not without defects,
necessitating Congress to revise the law again in 1976.25 The 1976 Act
purported to clarify unclear phrasing in the 1909 Act with regard to
calculating statutory damages,26 but post-1976 courts have nonetheless
diverged in their interpretation of the word “work” to include both

16. Id. at 130.
17. Id. at 131.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting William F. Patry, Latman’s The Copyright Law 4 (6th ed. 1986)).
20. Zawada, supra note 14, at 131.
21. Id.; see also Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat.
1074 (1909), superseded by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of
1909.
22. Zawada, supra, note 14 at 132.
23. Id. at 133.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 133.
26. Id.
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infringing27works and infringed works.28 Moreover, the Circuits remain
divided over the proper definition of “one work”: “To be sure, the last
sentence of § 504(c)(1) is facially ambiguous as to . . . whether a
compilation that infringes multiple separate copyrights . . . constitutes
‘one work.’”29
B. Compensatory Versus Non-Compensatory (Punitive) Damages:
Compensation, Deterrence, and Punishment
The primary purpose of statutory damages is to compensate the
copyright holder whose rights have been infringed.30 Prior to 1909, the
law merged compensatory, deterrent, and penal functions into one
remedy for infringement.31 Through the Copyright Act of 1909,
Congress separated these objectives by devising a criminal provision “to
punish infringements that were both willful and for profit,” and by
constructing “a nonpenal statutory damage regime” to compensate
copyright holders in cases where actual damages were difficult to prove,
with a stated range of awards that could serve to deter infringement.32
But when, in 1976, Congress revised the Copyright Act, the
compensatory and penal functions again became entwined.33 The 1976
Act introduced “very modest damages for the exceptional cases of
innocent infringement, a rather broad range of damages for ordinary
infringement, and enhanced levels of damages for the exceptional cases
of willful infringement.”34 The resulting case law does not reflect the
“tripartite structure”35 of 17 U.S.C. § 504.36 Often, instead, the courts
have granted awards on the basis of “the largely compensatory impulse
underlying statutory damages” for cases of innocent and ordinary
infringement, while “focus[ing] too heavily on deterrence and
punishment” in finding ordinary infringers to be willful.37
Furthermore, in light of the risks that statutory damages awards
“can be arbitrary and excessive,”38 some in the legal field advocate that
27. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531 (1987); Milene
Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288 (1982).
28. Zawada, supra note 14, at 134.
29. WB Music Corp. v. RTV Communication Group, Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2006).
30. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 444 (2009).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id. at 444.
36. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 30, at 445.
37. Id.
38. Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright
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“extra-compensatory” damages should receive the due process review
afforded to punitive damages:39
When aggregated over large numbers of works . . . even the
minimum statutory damage award has a punitive effect and imposes
an unconstitutional grossly excessive penalty. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
merely specifies a very wide range within which a statutory damage
award per work infringed must fall, leaving gross discretion to the
judge or jury, but even the minimum statutory damage amount can
be excessive when aggregated based on the number of works
infringed.40

And while the law is settled that “grossly excessive” punitive
damages awards violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,41
the Supreme Court has also recognized that, in certain circumstances,
“large awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns.”42
The Court studies the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory
damages in cases where punitive damages may be excessive.43
Embracing this rationale, lower courts have found that an exorbitant
award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount is “out
of all reasonable proportion”44 to the harm caused by defendant’s
conduct—in the interest of this note, the copyright infringer’s infringing
actions.
C. 17 U.S.C. § 504 and the “One-Work Limitation”
Copyright law is codified in Title 17 of the United States Code; §
504 specifies the remedies for infringement, including actual damages,
profits, and statutory damages. The relevant portions of § 504(c)(1) and
(2), pertaining to statutory damages, are reproduced below:
(1) [T]he copyright holder may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work .
. . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court
Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 307 (2009).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 308.
41. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 04-1671
MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (first citing State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003), then citing 1 BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580) (the ratio between
punitive damages and compensatory damages is “the most commonly cited indicium of an
unreasonable or excessive . . . award”).
44. Id.
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considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a
compilation or derivative work constitute one work.45
(2) In a case where the [court finds] that infringement was committed
willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case
where the [court finds that the] infringer was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.46

As § 504 indicates, and as the Circuits’ differing tests exemplify,
predicting the amount of statutory damages awarded in any given
copyright infringement case is not easily done, despite the seemingly
formulaic approach described above, largely because an award may fall
within a broad statutory range.47 Non-willful infringers are liable for
$750–$30,000 per work infringed.48 The maximum penalty increases to
$150,000 per work infringed for willful infringers, and even “innocent”
infringers are liable for at least $200 per work infringed.49
The unpredictability of statutory damages awards is compounded
by the issue under dissection in this note: the “one-work limitation” in §
504(c)(1). To the infringer’s advantage, the “one-work limitation,”
when applicable, “significantly reduces” liability since “one infringed
work merits only one grant of statutory damages, no matter how many
times the work has been infringed.”50 The last sentence of § 504(c)(1)
appears unambiguous: “all the parts of a compilation51 or derivative
work52 constitute one work” (emphases added). But the confusion arises
45. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017).
46. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017).
47. Andrew Berger, Why It’s Difficult to Predict the Amount of Statutory Damages
Plaintiff Will Be Awarded in Copyright Litigation-Revised Version, IP In BRIEF (Jan. 10,
2012), http://www.ipinbrief.com/whyitsdifficultpredictstatutorydamages/.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Andrew Berger, Here Are Some More Answers to End the Confusion About Statutory
Damages in Copyright Litigation (Part II), IP IN BRIEF (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.ipinbrief.com/ending-confusion-statutory-damages-ii/
[hereinafter
Berger,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Litigation].
51. “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term ‘compilation’ includes
collective works.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2017).
52. “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work
of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2017).
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because the statute does not clarify whose compilation or derivative
work it refers to.53 That is, the compilation or derivative work could be
either plaintiff’s copyrighted work that defendant infringed or
defendant’s work created from a number of plaintiff’s separately
copyrighted works.54
The courts disagree as to whether § 504(c)(1) addresses the
plaintiff or the defendant as the owner of the compilation or derivative
work. Most courts assume that the “one-work limitation” applies to
plaintiff’s copyrighted works, which defendant has infringed,55 while
other courts have found that the limitation bears upon defendant’s works,
regardless of how many of plaintiff’s separate copyrighted works may
be infringed.56
D. The Circuit Split: Two Approaches
In deciding what constitutes “one work” for the purposes of
calculating statutory damages in copyright infringement cases, the
Circuits are split between two approaches.57 The first is a “ ‘ functional
[test], with the focus on whether each expression . . . has an independent
economic value and is, in itself, viable.’ ” 58 The second test, sometimes
referred to as the “issuance test,”59 assesses “ ‘ whether the plaintiff—the
copyright holder—issued its works separately, or together as a unit.’ ” 60
At least four Circuits have adopted the independent economic value
test,61 while at least one Circuit has specifically rejected it in favor of the
issuance test.62
53. Berger, Statutory Damages in Copyright Litigation, supra note 50.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. (In a case where the defendant packaged 64 of plaintiff’s photographs into
four magazine compilations, the court found that plaintiff was still limited to only four
statutory damages awards).
57. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018).
58. Id. (quoting Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir.
1993)).
59. Adam D. Riser, Defining “Compilation”: The Second Circuit’s Formalist Approach
and the Resulting Issuance Test, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 822, 824 (2012) (discussing
“the Second Circuit's issuance test developed in Bryant II”).
60. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bryant v. Media
Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2010)).
61. Andrew Berger, When Does a Copyrighted Work Qualify as a “Work” for Purposes
of
Fixing
Statutory
Damages?,
IP
In
BRIEF
(May
25,
2010),
http://www.ipinbrief.com/mcsmusic/ [hereinafter Berger, Copyrighted Work] (listing the
First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits as having adopted the independent economic value
test).
62. BMG Rights Mgmt., 199 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (citing Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142, decided
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1. The Independent Economic Value Test
The First Circuit, in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea,63
articulated the independent economic value test. There, the exclusive
licensee of videotape recordings of television programs filed suit for
copyright infringement against a video rental store operator.64 The
district court entered judgment for plaintiff-licensee65 and ordered
defendant-video rental store operator to pay plaintiff $2,500 in statutory
damages for one work infringed.66 On appeal, the First Circuit agreed
with the lower court’s finding that defendant-store operator had
infringed copyrights for the original recordings of the television
programs and that plaintiff-licensee had exclusive rights to distribute the
copyrighted recordings.67 Because the court found that plaintiff-licensee
had exclusive rights, the plaintiff was entitled to recover statutory
damages for defendant-store operator’s copyright infringement of the
recordings.68 But at this point, the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s finding as to the number of works infringed for which defendant
was liable.69
The district court found that defendant-store holder had infringed
one work (comprising four episodes of a television program, Jade Fox)
for the purposes of calculating statutory damages70 based on two facts.
First, plaintiff-licensee sold or rented only complete sets of Jade Fox to
defendant-store holder; accordingly, the court inferred that plaintiff
regarded Jade Fox episodes “as one work for economic purposes
notwithstanding the rental by customers of only a few episodes at a time
or its production in separate episodes.”71 Second, the copyrights for the
four episodes of Jade Fox in question were registered with the Copyright
Office on a single form,72 suggesting to the court that “[the author of
Jade Fox] considered at least these four episodes to be one work.”73 The
court of appeals was not persuaded by the district court’s reasoning with
regard to either fact.74
Instead, the First Circuit, counting each episode of Jade Fox as a
by the Second Circuit).
63. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1106.
64. Id. at 1109.
65. Id. at 1110.
66. Id. at 1119.
67. Id. at 1110.
68. See id. at 1117–18.
69. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 1108.
71. Id. at 1117 (quoting the district court’s opinion).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting the district court’s opinion).
74. Id.
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separate copyrighted work, stated that defendant had infringed four
works, not merely one.75 On the district court’s first argument, the First
Circuit asserted that “[a] distributor’s decision to sell or rent complete
sets of a series to video stores in no way indicates that each episode in
the series is unable to stand alone.”76 The court pointed expressly to the
fact that renters may rent and watch “as few or as many tapes as they
want”—perhaps without ever renting or watching all of the episodes in
a series—77 and, furthermore, each episode of Jade Fox was separately
produced.78
On the district court’s second argument, the First Circuit could not
find supporting authority for the district court’s conclusion that
registering multiple works with the Copyright Office on a single form
equates to registering a single work for purposes of awarding statutory
damages.79 Studying the language of the Copyright Office’s regulations
with respect to registration,80 the court found that a copyright holder may
register multiple works on a single form as a single work for the
purposes of registration without forfeiting the option of recovering
statutory damages in future for infringement for each work registered.81
A Ninth Circuit district court reached a similar outcome on the issue
of the number of works that qualify for statutory damages in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo,82 where defendants operated a website
through which they provided and sold access to thousands of
unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted photographs.83
Defendants argued that they were liable for infringing only one
copyrighted work because the images in question appeared as a
collection in only one of plaintiff’s copyrighted magazines.84 The court
rejected this contention, finding defendants guilty of 7,475 incidents of
copyright infringement, and plaintiff recovered statutory damages in the
amount of $500 for each infringed work (totaling $3,737,500).85
In explanation, the court cited the independent economic value test
applied in Gamma Audio & Video, looking to whether each of plaintiff’s
photographs “has an ‘independent economic value’ and is viable on its
75. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1119.
76. Id. at 1117.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(A).
81. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1117.
82. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97–0670–IEG (LSP), 1998 WL 207856
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1998).
83. Id. at *1.
84. Id. at *5.
85. Id.
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own.”86 That is, “separate copyrights are not distinct works unless they
can ‘live their own copyright life.’ ” 87 The court found that each image
had an independent economic value and was viable on its own,
elaborating that “although each of these images may have appeared in a
[single magazine], these images are subject to re-use and redistribution
in accordance with various licensing arrangements.”88 In approving an
award of statutory damages for 7,475 incidents of copyright
infringement, the court further reasoned that each of plaintiff’s
photographs constituted a separate copyrighted work because (1) each
image represented an independent and “copyrightable” effort involving
a particular model, photographer, and location, (2) all of the images
remained individual efforts despite being compiled into one magazine,
and (3) defendants provided and sold access to each image separately.89
Several courts continue to employ the independent economic value
test as expressed in Gamma Audio & Video (1993),90 though some, such
as the Playboy Enterprises court (1998), have contributed to or modified
the list of factors to consider in determining what constitutes “one work”
for the purposes of calculating statutory damages.91 Thus, some
inconsistency exists among the Circuits that favor this approach, as
demonstrated by a case predating Gamma Audio & Video and one
succeeding Playboy Enterprises.92
In Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,93 a 1990 case, defendant sold shirts
featuring Minnie and Mickey Mouse in six different poses.94 The district
court found defendant guilty of six incidents of infringement and
awarded Disney $15,000 in statutory damages per infringement.95 On
appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment.96
Although the court acknowledged that “Mickey and Minnie are certainly
distinct, viable works with separate economic value and copyright lives
of their own,” it could not extend the independent economic value test
to include each of defendant’s six shirt designs depicting different poses

86. Id. (quoting Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1116–17).
87. Id. (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
88. Playboy Enterprises, 1998 WL 207856, at *5.
89. Id.
90. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61 (listing the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits as having adopted the independent economic value test).
91. Playboy Enterprises, 1998 WL 207856, at *5.
92. See Disney, 897 F.2d 565; MCS Music America, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:09-cv00597, 2010 WL 500430 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010).
93. Disney, 897 F.2d at 565.
94. Id. at 567.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 570.
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by the mice, limiting the number of works infringed to only two.97 In
calculating statutory damages, the court held that the number of works,
not the number of infringements, is determinative: “Mickey is still
Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning, running or walking, waving
his left hand or his right.”98
More recently, in 2010, the court in MCS Music America, Inc. v.
Yahoo! Inc.99 added “a further wrinkle” to the independent economic
value test, holding that multiple musical compositions—all of which
may have independent economic value—do not qualify for statutory
damages if the works are essentially the same.100 In MCS Music
America, plaintiffs owned exclusive copyrights of 215 musical
compositions; defendants digitally transmitted 308 sound recordings
embodying all 215 of plaintiff’s copyrighted works, though plaintiffs did
not claim ownership of these recordings.101 Plaintiffs sought to recover
statutory damages for each of defendant’s recordings (all 308), claiming
that each was a separate and independent work.102 Defendants disagreed,
arguing that plaintiffs could not recover for defendant’s recordings since
plaintiffs had no ownership rights to them.103
Following the reasoning in Disney, the court declared that “even
though each musical composition is a distinct, viable work with separate
economic value and copyright lives of their own, any variation of that
‘work’ is still simply one ‘work’ for the purposes of statutory
damages.”104 To recover statutory damages, a work must be registered
with the Copyright Office, and plaintiffs had neither ownership nor
registration rights to defendant’s recordings.105 Thus, defendant’s sound
recordings, as variations of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, did not
constitute separate works for which plaintiffs could recover statutory
damages.106
The independent economic value test, therefore, exists today as
some combination of the rules set forth by various courts, including
those that decided Gamma Audio & Video, Playboy Enterprises, Disney,
and MCS Music America. All variations of the test inquire into whether

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. MCS Music America, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00597, 2010 WL 500430
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010).
100. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61.
101. MCS Music America, 2010 WL 500430, at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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a work has independent economic value and is viable on its own.107
Some courts have phrased these requirements as asking whether each
work can “live [its] own copyright life.”108 Other courts have
emphasized that an award of statutory damages is available only to
works that have “a viable economic life as well as a viable copyright life
distinct from other works at issue.”109
2. The Issuance Test
Whereas the first approach may be termed a functional test—
computing the number of awards as a function of the economic viability,
if any, of each work110—the second test focuses on “whether the
plaintiff—the copyright holder—issued its works separately, or together
as a unit.”111 In Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc.,112 songwriters
and their record label brought suit for copyright infringement against a
production company and a music wholesaler, on the grounds that the
production company authorized the music wholesaler to create digital
copies of individual songs from plaintiffs’ albums that were available
online.113 The district court held that plaintiffs’ albums were
compilations and granted only one award of statutory damages per
album infringed, irrespective of the number of songs copied by
defendants.114
On appeal, Bryant required the Second Circuit to address one of
the ambiguities inherent in the language of the statutory damages
provision in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), namely whether the word
“compilation” in the “one-work limitation” (“all the parts of a
compilation or derivative work constitute one work”) alludes to the
infringed work created by plaintiff or the infringing work that defendant
devised from plaintiff’s copyrighted works.115 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s award of statutory damages on a per-album
basis,116 relying on two of its previous decisions on the issue of “what
107. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116–17 (1st Cir. 1993).
108. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
109. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61.
110. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018).
111. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 135.
113. Id. at 138–39.
114. Id. at 139.
115. Andrew Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights: The Second Circuit Provides Some Further
Answers About the “One-Work Limitation” on Grants of Statutory Damages Involving an
Infringing Compilation, IP In BRIEF (May 6, 2010), http://www.ipinbrief.com/bryant/
[hereinafter Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights].
116. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142.
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constitutes a compilation subject to § 504(c)(1)’s one-award
restriction”:117 Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications
International, Ltd.118 and WB Music Corp. v. RTV Communication
Group, Inc.119
In Twin Peaks, plaintiff “issued each episode of a television series
sequentially, each at a different time”; defendant “printed eight teleplays
from the series in one book” (emphasis added).120 There, the Second
Circuit granted plaintiff a separate award of statutory damages for each
of the eight teleplays because plaintiff had issued its works separately.121
The court, deferring to the “plain language” of § 504(c)(1), distinguished
Bryant from Twin Peaks: “[h]ere, it is the copyright holders who issued
their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue [a]lbums.”122 Thus,
the Bryant plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to one award of statutory
damages per album.123
WB Music Corp. likewise failed to support the Bryant plaintiffs’
claim for statutory damages on a per-song basis. In that case, plaintiff
had issued thirteen songs separately.124 Again, defendant gathered the
individual works into one compilation—an album.125 Plaintiff recovered
a separate award of statutory damages for each of the thirteen songs
because defendant presented no evidence “that any of the separately
copyrighted works were included in a compilation authorized by the
[plaintiff]” (emphasis original).126
In explicitly declining to adopt the independent economic value
test approved by some other Circuits,127 the Second Circuit stressed that
the language of § 504(c)(1) permits “no exception for a part of a
compilation that has independent economic value.”128 The court
recognized that infringers can now more easily copy parts of an album
separately due to the increasing availability of music digitally and
online,129 but ultimately refused to endorse the independent economic
117. Id. at 141.
118. Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir.
1993).
119. WB Music Corp. v. RTV Comm. Group, Inc., 445 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2006).
120. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141 (citing Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1381).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing WB Music Corp., 445 F.3d at 541).
125. Id.
126. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141.
127. “This Court has never adopted the independent economic value test, and we decline
to do so in this case.” Id. at 142.
128. Id. (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)).
129. Id.

2018]

ONE WORK

389

value test because doing so would contradict Congress’s intent in
drafting § 504(c)(1).130 The “one-work limitation” “applies even if the
parts of the compilation are ‘regarded as independent works for other
purposes.’ ” 131
Hence, the issuance test for determining what constitutes “one
work”—which endeavors to identify copyrighted works as either
separately issued or released as parts of a unit—presents a seemingly
simple formula, as established by the Second Circuit in a series of cases.
The deciding factor appears largely to be plaintiff’s intent132 in each
case—that is, whether plaintiff produced the infringed works
individually or as a single compilation. Nonetheless, the issuance test is
not without some vagueness: an infringer is liable only for as many
awards of statutory damages as matches the total number of separate
works, despite the fact that the individual parts of a compilation may be
“regarded as independent works for other purposes.”133
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The Circuits are divided in their approaches to deciding what
constitutes “one work” for the purposes of recovering an award of
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. Because the Copyright Act of
1976 does not define the word “work,” the courts differ in their
interpretations of the “one-work limitation” imposed by § 504(c)(1),134
that “all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one
work.”135 Some courts, including the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits, have adhered to a functional approach, the independent
economic value test, holding that “a distinct ‘work’ must be able to live
its own copyright life.”136 Other courts, notably the Second Circuit,
apply the issuance test, prioritizing the number of works issued
separately—each retaining its own copyright—as opposed to those
created as a unit, all of which are protected by a single copyright.137
Federal courts “have exclusive jurisdiction over actions that arise
under federal copyright laws.”138 Thus, the lack of homogeneity among
130. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)).
131. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)).
132. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141.
133. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 162 (1976).
134. Zawada, supra note 14, at 142.
135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017).
136. Zawada, supra note 14, at 142.
137. See Bryant, 603 F.3d 135; Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d 1366; WB Music Corp.,
445 F.3d 538.
138. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a))
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act
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the federal courts in adjudicating awards of statutory damages in
copyright infringement cases generates uncertainty:139 the courts’
differing approaches could be problematic for copyright holders that are
victims of infringement in multiple jurisdictions.140 The entertainment
industry, which is “at the center of many copyright disputes,”141 is
especially likely to encounter the most unpredictability as a result of the
Circuit split,142 owing to the fact that New York and Los Angeles “now
face different [statutory] award possibilities depending on the
jurisdiction.”143
Therefore, the inherent variability in awards of statutory damages
under 17 U.S.C. § 504144—a consequence of the courts’ discretionary
power145—is compounded by the Circuits’ contrasting interpretations of
and tests for determining what constitutes “one work” for copyright
infringement purposes, and a means of resolving this dispute is
necessary to achieve uniformity of the law in every jurisdiction.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Independent Economic Value Test
1. Unsupported by the Plain Language of the Copyright Act of
1976 and Its Legislative History
Though several of the Circuits have implemented and continue to
employ the independent economic value test for addressing the “onework limitation,” some in the legal field contend that these Circuits have
interpreted § 504(c)(1) too broadly.146 Attesting to the involvement of
special interest groups in drafting copyright laws, opponents of the
independent economic value test argue that § 504(c)(1) “should be
of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.”).
139. Riser, supra note 59, at 846.
140. For example, forum shopping in internet piracy cases. Id.
141. Id. at 846–47.
142. Id. at 846.
143. Id.
144. Statutory damages range from $200 per work infringed in cases of “innocent”
infringement to $150,000 per work infringed in cases of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C.A. §
504(c)(1)–(2) (West 2017).
145. “In a case where the [court finds] that infringement was committed willfully, the
court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$150,000. In a case where the [court finds that the] infringer was not aware and had no reason
to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200”
(emphases added). 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017).
146. Betselot A. Zeleke, Federal Judges Gone Wild: The Copyright Act of 1976 and
Technology, Rejecting the Independent Economic Value Test, 55 HOW. L.J. 247, 268 (2011).

2018]

ONE WORK

391

narrowly construed against infringement so as not to confer any benefit
on a special interest group that has not bargained for such an advantage
during negotiations.”147 Accordingly, these critics support the Second
Circuit’s narrower interpretation148of the statute and its adoption of the
issuance test, under which a court should grant multiple awards of
statutory damages only if the copyright holder issued its works
independently.149
One facet of the independent economic value test at odds with the
1976 Act and its legislative history is that judiciary discretion may still
allow “excessive statutory damages,”150 despite the “per infringed work”
provision in the 1976 Act intended to counter the wording in the 1909
Act that permitted multiple awards of statutory damages for a single
infringed “work.”151 Under the 1909 Act, a copyright holder was entitled
to recover statutory damages “per infringement” from the infringer.152
The 1976 Act, however, limits statutory damages to one award “per
infringement work,” regardless of the number of infringements of the
same “work.”153 But the independent economic value test weakens the
1976 Act’s limits on the court’s discretion by “allowing a judge to
inquire into the economic viability of parts of a compilation of
‘work.’ ” 154 By contrast, the issuance test strictly enforces the “onework limitation” where compilations, not individual works, have been
infringed.
2. The Dangers of Enhancing Excessive Statutory Damages
Further detracting from the feasibility of the independent economic
value test is the risk of exacerbating excessively large awards of statutory
damages.155 Statutory damages for copyright infringement may be as
low as $200 and as high as $150,000 per work infringed.156 In a
jurisdiction that endorses the independent economic value test, courts
may be inclined to grant multiple awards of statutory damages as a
punitive measure.157 Copyright infringers then face the prospect of
pecuniary liabilities “so extreme as to amount to a criminal penalty
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
See infra Section I.D.2.
Zeleke, supra note 146, at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 278.
17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017).
Zeleke, supra note 146, at 279.
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imposed without providing the defendant[s] with the benefits of the
safeguards the criminal law system provides,”158—perhaps so extreme
as to be unconstitutional.159
Playboy Enterprises serves as an example of multiple awards of
statutory damages amounting to an immensely (and possibly
excessively) large payout: the court found defendants guilty of
infringing 7,475 of plaintiff’s photographs and plaintiff recovered $500
The Playboy
for each infringed work—totaling $3,737,500.160
Enterprises court authorized this hefty compensatory sum under the
independent economic value test, but critics of this approach
discriminate between the compensatory and non-compensatory
(punitive) components of statutory damages.161
While the compensatory component grants relief to the copyright
holder for the actual loss he or she suffered,162 the non-compensatory
component punishes the infringer and deters others from committing the
same offense.163 The 1976 Act, through 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), provides
for punitive damages by allowing the court to increase awards of
statutory damages in cases of willful infringement164 (to the statutory
maximum of $150,000 per work infringed). And because the 1976 Act
affords the court the discretion to award both compensatory and noncompensatory damages, the independent economic value test, at least as
currently enforced, unjustifiably magnifies the punitive impact of
statutory damages for copyright infringement.

158. Id. (citing Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 601 (2005) (“Since punitive damages act in a quasi-criminal manner, ‘straddling’ civil
and criminal penalties, they run the risk of imposing what amount to criminal penalties
without the increased safeguards that criminal law offers.”).
159. Id. (citing J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal
File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004) (“These [copyright] lawsuits
illustrate that the punitive effect of even the minimum statutory damage award, when
aggregated across a large number of similar acts, can grow so enormous that it becomes an
unconstitutionally excessive punishment.”).
160. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97–0670–IEG (LSP), 1998 WL 207856,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1998).
161. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 279 (citing Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statutory
Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 601 (2005)).
162. See generally id.
163. See generally id. at 280.
164. See generally id.
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B. The Issuance Test
1. Shielding Infringers
Despite the issuance test’s strict adherence to the legislative intent
of the “one-work limitation,”165 its narrower approach effectively
“shelters infringement,”166 accomplishing the opposite goal of copyright
law, which purports to encourage creation by protecting the creators—
the copyright holders.167 The issuance test “shields infringers from
multiple awards of statutory damages no matter how many works they
infringe” merely because the copyright holder chose to issue the
infringed works as a compilation and not as separate works.168
Bryant highlights this paradox. In that case, plaintiffs sought to
recover statutory damages for each of several songs that defendants
copied from plaintiff’s digital albums, but the court held that each album
constituted a compilation and granted plaintiffs only one award of
The Bryant court’s decision
statutory damages per album.169
underscores the “shielding” that the “one-work limitation” affords
copyright infringers under the issuance test. Digital technology readily
aids infringers in dissociating compilations (albums) into separate works
(individual songs),170 yet 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) only compensates the
copyright holder for one incident of infringement, “irrespective of the
number of songs copied” by the infringer.171
2. Incentivizing Infringement
The issuance test defeats, at least in part, the goal of copyright
law—encouraging creation by protecting the creators172—not solely
because its interpretation of § 504(c)(1) “shelters infringement.” The
test also “incentivizes infringement.”173 In a jurisdiction that follows the
issuance test, potential copyright infringers “may be more likely to
increase infringement”174 of compilations if they are aware that the court
will, at most, grant only one award of statutory damages for each
compilation infringed, not separate damages for each individual work
infringed. For example, an infringer intending to illegally download a
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 268.
Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights, supra note 115.
“The one-work limitation, instead of stimulating creation, shelters infringement.” Id.
Id.
Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2010).
Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights, supra note 115.
Id.
Id.
Riser, supra note 59, at 849.
Id.
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single copyrighted song is “incentivized” to obtain the entire album
because the issuance test imposes no additional awards of statutory
damages for infringing the album as opposed to infringing one or more
songs.175
Awarding statutory damages advances two objectives: providing
relief for a plaintiff whose copyrights have been infringed and penalizing
defendant’s infringing conduct.176 Under the issuance test, however,
infringers are subject to relatively smaller penalties177 and are
consequently less inclined to refrain from infringing.178 Although
Congress has regularly expanded the scope of copyright protections over
time,179 the incentivizing nature of the issuance test impedes the goal of
copyright law, which is to promote creation. Authors may be less willing
to create new works—or, at least, to share them with the public—if they
are unlikely to receive adequate compensation in the event of
infringement.180
The holdings in Twin Peaks and WB Music Corp. compared with
the outcome in Bryant demonstrates the fallibility of the issuance test.
In Twin Peaks, plaintiff issued several episodes of a television series
“sequentially, each at a different time,”181 eight of which defendant
printed as teleplays in one book. The Second Circuit awarded plaintiff
separate statutory damages for each of the eight teleplays because
plaintiff had issued the episodes individually. The same court likewise
upheld separate awards of statutory damages in WB Music Corp., where
plaintiff had issued thirteen songs independently that defendant
compiled into an album. In each case, because defendant created one
infringing compilation, plaintiff recovered statutory damages for
multiple works. By contrast, the Bryant plaintiff received only one
award of damages because defendant separated plaintiff’s compilation
(album) into independent works (songs). Thus, the issuance test
performs inconsistently, predominantly depending upon, in the words of
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. The court may grant a maximum of $150,000 per work infringed in statutory
damages for willful infringement, but the infringer would potentially be found liable for fewer
incidents of infringement in an issuance test jurisdiction than in an independent economic
value test jurisdiction (i.e., in the Second Circuit versus the First Circuit, respectively). See 17
U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2); see e.g., Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.
2010); Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993);
Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993).
178. Riser, supra note 59, at 849.
179. Congress has expanded the scope of copyright protections “to extend additional
protections and term limits to copyright holders.” Id.
180. Id.
181. Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1381 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the Second Circuit, whether defendant is able to prove “that any of the
separately copyrighted works were included in a compilation authorized
by the [plaintiff].”182
3. The Lack of Punitive Measures
Beyond its deficiencies with regard to shielding infringers and even
incentivizing infringement, the issuance test is an ineffective approach
to defining the “one-work limitation” because it lacks sufficient punitive
measures.183 The inadequacy of the punitive provisions of 17 U.S.C. §
504, manifest in the issuance test, favors the infringer. For example,184
a trial court may order a willful infringer to pay multiple awards of
substantial statutory damages for infringing numerous songs,185 but on
appeal, a Circuit court employing the issuance test may reduce the
infringer’s liability by finding that only a small number of groups of
songs were infringed.186 In these circumstances, requiring merely that
the infringer receives a favorable ruling on the issue of the number of
works infringed, “an infringer may profit in spite of a judgment awarding
maximum statutory damages. . . .”187
The issuance test for awarding statutory damages fails to deter
infringement in a second scenario, in which infringement occurs
“vertically” via a “distribution network.”188 To take another example,189
consider the chain of infringement that could befall a copyright holder
of a sound recording through a distribution network:
If the distributors violated only the distribution right . . . and the
manufacturers violated only the reproduction right, then [plaintiff]
may have been able to seek a separate award [of statutory damages]
from each defendant . . . But imagine that the defendants controlled
both manufacturing and distribution, rather than just distribution,
and vertically integrated the creation of each infringing [work] into
its distribution network.190

182. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2010).
183. See R. Collins Kilgore, Sneering at the Law: An Argument for Punitive Damages in
Copyright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 640 (2013).
184. Example adapted. See id. at 664.
185. Id.
186. Additionally, if the infringer chose “not to defend at the trial level to avoid discovery
and the costs of litigation” and received a favorable ruling on the issue of the number of works
infringed, no appeal would be necessary, “saving [the infringer] substantially on legal fees.”
Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 661.
189. Example adapted. See Kilgore, supra note 183, at 661.
190. Id.
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Defendants’ various infringing actions would no longer be separate
and, correspondingly, the number of awards of statutory damages
decreases;191 the distribution network acts a loophole undermining the
deterrent power of § 504. Additionally, minimizing the number of
infringers exacerbates the incentivizing effect of the issuance test:192 “an
infringer [such as a distribution network] may profit in spite of a
judgment awarding maximum statutory damages. . . .”193 Willful
infringers need no greater inducement. The issuance test, therefore, is a
defective deterrent against copyright infringement.
C. One Test for the “One-Work Limitation”
Circuit splits in the field of intellectual property are common
because the Supreme Court is simply unable to hear every case for which
it receives petitions, not to mention resolve every issue over which the
lower courts are divided.194 During both the 2009 and 2010 terms, the
Court reviewed only one copyright case.195 The Circuit courts’ dockets
are similarly brimming with non-copyright cases: in 2009, the Federal
Circuit decided 312 patent cases on the merits, while all of the other
courts of appeals combined only decided 168 trademark, copyright, and
patent cases on the merits.196 For these reasons, copyright holders whose
works have been infringed have ample motive to forum shop among the
Circuit courts.197
Copyright holders have even greater enticement to select the most
advantageous court when seeking statutory damages due to the
ambiguity of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)’s “one-work limitation.” Congress
could have—and probably should have, in light of the split in
authority—defined what constitutes “one work” for the purposes of
calculating statutory damages, but Congress did not do so.198 Hence, to
rectify the uncertainty clouding the adjudication of often exceptionally
large sums of money, to ensure that creation is protected, and to deter
future illegal conduct, the independent economic value test and the
191. Id.
192. Id. at 662.
193. Id. at 664.
194. Samantha M. Basso, When National Law Means Regional Law: A Look at the NonUniformity of Copyright Law and How the Federal Circuit Can Help, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 355,
356–57 (2011).
195. The author notes that patent law has “benefited greatly from the creation of the
Federal Circuit.” Inventors now receive more guidance with regard to the validity of their
patents across the country, and the Federal Circuit judges are well-versed in patent law. “The
‘other’ forms of intellectual property, however, do not enjoy such treatment.” Id. at 356.
196. Id. at 363–64.
197. Id. at 357.
198. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 280.
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issuance test should be reconciled in a new formulation that draws upon
the assets of both.
IV. PROPOSAL
An ideal test for the “one-work limitation” of 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)(1) achieves equilibrium between the undisputed economic value
of a copyright and the imperative that copyright holders are assured
protection for their creations.
The independent economic value test, by itself, accords plaintiffs
(in some cases) “absurd amounts of damages.”199 Shifting the standard
for “one work” from “per infringement” to “per infringed work”200
commits perhaps too much economic value to each of plaintiff’s
infringed works, with such value to be appraised at the judge’s discretion
and nothing else.201 A new test for the “one-work limitation” should
limit measures of economic value to predetermined (statutory)
parameters202 to preclude obscenely excessive awards as well as awards
so small as to have no significant compensatory (or punitive) effect.
These parameters should be reevaluated and, if appropriate, increased or
decreased periodically to accurately reflect the “current” value of the
copyrighted works at issue. Thus, the number of works that qualify for
awards of statutory damages depends upon whether each “work” in
question satisfies the statutory minimum threshold for sufficient
economic value.
The issuance test, on its own, recoups the inordinate payouts that
its counterpart may award, but demands a punitive element to deter
would-be infringers.
Although due process prohibits “grossly
excessive” punitive damages awards,203 in a new test for the “one-work
limitation,” Congress could implement statutory parameters to prevent
unconstitutional “extra-compensatory”204 damages, and the court could
adjust these parameters to suit individual defendants. For example, the
punitive aspect of statutory damages awards may be exactly enough to

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Judges are, of course, limited by the statutory minimum and maximum awards, as
stated in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2).
202. This author considered drafting a new test that would permit expert testimony, in
very limited circumstances, to supplement the statutory parameters. Inviting such testimony,
however, could lead to grossly excessive awards if not checked by judicial or statutory
guidance.
203. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 04-1671
MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005).
204. Berg, supra note 38, at 307.
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negate defendant’s profits;205 this threshold amount is necessary to
persuade copyright holders to “invest in and enforce their
copyrights”206when they are unable to prove actual damages. But
beyond ensuring that copyright holders “break even,” the statutory
scheme for punitive damages should impose a minimum penalty
independent of the compensatory damages awarded on the basis of
economic value. One component of the award remedies plaintiff’s
injury; the other punishes infringement and deters future illegal conduct.
CONCLUSION
The Circuit courts, limited and influenced by the particular cases
brought before them, have attempted individually to define what
constitutes “one work” in copyright infringement cases for the purposes
of calculating statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. As a result, two
leading approaches have emerged, the independent economic value test
and the issuance test. But the lack of uniformity among the Circuits
regarding the “correct” interpretation of the “one-work limitation” of §
504 has engendered uncertainty as to whether a court will, in any given
case, award exorbitant compensatory damages to a copyright holder or
impose punitive damages upon the infringer sufficient to deter potential
future wrongdoers. Therefore, until the Supreme Court mandates
otherwise, a new test for the “one-work limitation” should encompass
the advantages of each of the two current tests with modifications to
better serve the twin goals of copyright law: fostering creation and
deterring misappropriation of others’ creative efforts.

205. Kilgore, supra note 183, at 640.
206. Id. at 642.

